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EQUALITY AND EQUIVALENCE, INTUITIONISTICALLY
WIM VELDMAN
For Mohammad Ardeshir, in friendship
Solem enim e mundo tollere videntur qui amicitiam e vita tollunt.
They take away the sun from the world, surely, those who take away friendship from life.
Cicero, de Amicitia, XIII 47
Abstract. We show that the intuitionistic first-order theory of equality has
continuum many complete extensions. We also study the Vitali equivalence
relation and show there are many intuitionistically precise versions of it.
1. Introduction
We want to contribute to L.E.J. Brouwer’s program of doing mathematics
intuitionistically.
We follow his advice to interpret the logical constants constructively.
A conjunction A ∧ B is considered proven if and only if one has a proof of A
and also a proof of B.
A disjunction A ∨B is considered proven if and only if either A or B is proven.
An implication A → B is considered proven if and only if there is a proof of B
using the assumption A.
A negation ¬A is considered proven if and only if there is a proof of A→ 0 = 1.
An existential statement ∃x ∈ V [P (x)] is considered proven if and only an ele-
ment x0 is produced together with a proof of the associated statement P (x0).
A universal statement ∀x ∈ V [P (x)] is considered proven if and only if a method
is given that produces, given any x in V , a proof of the associated statement P (x).
We also use some axioms proposed by Brouwer: his Continuity Principle, our
Axiom 1, a slightly stronger version of it, the First Axiom of Continuous Choice,
our Axiom 2, and his Thesis on Bars in N , our Axiom 4.
In some of our proofs, we use an Axiom of Countable Choice, our Axiom 3.
Intuitionistic mathematicians, who accept infinite step-by-step constructions not
determined by a rule, consider this axiom a reasonable proposal.
Finally, we believe that generalized inductive definitions, like our Definition 24,
fall within the compass of intuitionistic mathematics.
Our subject is the (intuitionistic) first-order theory of equality. By considering
structures (X ,=) where X is a subset of Baire space N = ωω and = the usual
equality relation on N , we find that the theory has an uncountable and therefore
astonishing1 variety of elementarily different infinite models and, as a consequence,
an astonishing variety of complete extensions, see Theorem 23. The key observa-
tion2 leading to this result is the recognition that, in a spread3, an isolated point
is the same as a decidable point.4 It follows that the set of the non-isolated points
1Classically, all infinite models of the first-order theory of equality are elementarily equivalent.
2This observation has been made earlier in [10, Section 5]. The first part of the present paper
elaborates part of [10, Section 5].
3Every spread is a closed subset of N , see Section 4.
4See Lemma 7. α ∈ X ⊆ N is a decidable point of X if and only if ∀β ∈ X [α = β ∨ ¬(α = β)].
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of a spread is a definable subset of the spread. In spreads that are transparent5,
the set of the non-isolated points of the spread coincides with the coherence of the
spread6, and the coherence itself is spread. It may happen that the coherence of
a transparent spread is transparent itself and then the coherence of the coherence
also is a definable subset of the spread. And so on.
Any structure (N , R), where R is an equivalence relation on N , is a model of
the theory of equality. We study the Vitali equivalence relation, see Section 9, as
an example. This equivalence relation, in contrast to the equality relation on N , is
not stable7, see Theorem 24.
There is a host of binary relations on N that, from a classical point of view,
all would be the same as the Vitali equivalence relation, see Sections 10 and 11,
and especially Definition 24, Corollary 32 and Definition 27. It turned out to be
difficult to find differences between them that are first-order expressible. We did
find some such differences, however, by studying structures (N ,=, R), where R is
an intuitionistic version of the Vitali equivalence relation and = the usual equality,
see Section 12.
The paper is divided into 13 Sections and consists roughly of two parts. Sections
2-8 lead up to the result that the theory of equality has continuum many complete
extensions, see Theorem 23. Sections 9-12 treat the Vitali equivalence relations.
Section 13 lists some notations and conventions and may be used by the reader as
a reference.
2. Intuitionistic model theory
Given a relational structure A = (A,R0, R1, . . . , Rn−1), we construct a first-
order language L with basic formulas Ri(x0, x1, . . . , xli−1), where i < n and li is
the arity of Ri. The formulas of L are obtained from the basic formulas by using
∧,∨,→,¬, ∃, ∀ in the usual way.
For every formula ϕ = ϕ(x0, x1, . . . , xm−1) of L, for all a0, a1, . . . , am−1 in A, we
define the statement:
A |= ϕ[a0, a1, . . . , am−1]
(A realizes ϕ if x0, x1, . . . , xm−1 are interpreted by a0, a1, . . . , am−1, respectively),
as Tarski did it, with the proviso that connectives and quantifiers are interpreted
intuitionistically.
A formula ϕ of L without free variables will be called a sentence.
A theory (in L) is a set of sentences of L.
Given a theory Γ in L and a structure A, we define: A realizes Γ if and only if,
for every ϕ in Γ, A |= ϕ.
Given a structure B that has the same signature as A, so that the formulas of
L may be interpreted in B as well as in A, we let Th(B), the theory of B, be the
set of all sentences ϕ of L such that B |= ϕ.
A theory Γ in L will be called a complete theory if and only if there exists a
structure B such that Γ = Th(B).
This agrees with one of the uses of the expression ‘complete theory’ in classical,
that is: usual, non-intuitionistic, model theory, see [4, p. 43]. Note that one may
be unable to decide, for a given sentence ϕ and a given structure B, whether or
not B |= ϕ. Intuitionistically, it is not true that, for every complete theory Γ and
every sentence ϕ, either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ.
5see Definition 8.
6The coherence of a closed set is the set of its limit points, see Definition 7.
7R ⊆ N ×N is called stable if ∀α∀β[¬¬αRβ → αRβ], see Definition 21.
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Complete theories Γ,∆ are positively different if one may point out a sentence
ψ such that ψ ∈ Γ and ¬ψ ∈ ∆.8
Structures A,B are elementarily equivalent if and only if Th(A) = Th(B) and
(positively) elementarily different if Th(A) is positively different from Th(B).
Let Γ be a theory in L. A good question is the following:
How many complete theories ∆ can one find extending Γ?
We will say: Γ admits countably many complete extensions if and only if there
exists an infinite sequence ∆0,∆1, . . . of complete theories extending Γ such that,
for all m,n, if m 6= n, then ∆m,∆n are (positively) different, and
Γ admits continuum many complete extensions if and only if there exists a func-
tion α 7→ ∆α associating to every element α of C = 2ω a complete theory extending
Γ such that for all α, β, if9 α # β, then ∆α,∆β are (positively) different.
A main result of this paper is that the first-order theory of equality admits
continuum many complete extensions.
3. Equality may be undecidable
The first-order theory EQ of equality consists of the following three axioms:
(1) ∀x[x = x],
(2) ∀x∀y[x = y→ y = x] and
(3) ∀x∀y∀z[(x = y ∧ y = z)→ x = z].
A model of EQ is a structure of the form (V,R), where V is a set and R is
an equivalence relation on V , possibly, but not necessarily, the equality relation
belonging to V .
Classically, every complete extension of EQ is realized in one of the structures
from the list: ({0},=), ({0, 1},=), ({0, 1, 2},=), . . . and (ω,=). This shows that,
classically, EQ admits of (no more than) countably many complete extensions.
Intuitionistically, however, we have to observe that all structures on this list
satisfy the sentence
∀x∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)],
that is: the equality relation, on each of these sets, is a decidable relation.
It is well-known, however, that the equality relation on the set N is not a decid-
able relation. Let us recall why.
If we define an element α of N by stipulating:
∀n[α(n) 6= 0↔ ∀i < 99[d(n+ i) = 9]],
where d : N→ {0, 1, . . . , 9} is the decimal expansion of π, we are unable to decide:
α = 0 ∨ ¬(α = 0).
This is because, if α = 0, then ¬∃n∀i < 99[α(n+ i) = 9], and, if ¬(α = 0), then
¬¬∃n∀i < 99[d(n+ i) = 9], and we have no proof of either alternative.
This example shows us that the statement ∀α[α = 0 ∨ ¬(α = 0)], for a con-
structive mathematician, who interprets the disjunction strongly, is a reckless state-
ment.10
The following axiom, used by Brouwer11, implies that the statement
∀α[α = 0 ∨ ¬(α = 0)] even leads to a contradiction.
8 If ψ ∈ Γ and ¬ψ ∈ ∆, then ¬ψ ∈ ∆ and ¬¬ψ ∈ Γ: the relation positively different is
symmetric.
9α # β ↔ α ⊥ β ↔ ∃n[α(n) 6= β(n)], see Section 13.
10A statement is reckless if one might think it is true while the intuitionistic mathematician
understands there is no proof for his constructive reading of it.
11see [10].
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Axiom 1 (Brouwer’s Continuity Principle).
For all R ⊆ N × ω, if ∀α∃n[αRn], then ∀α∃m∃n∀β[αm ⊏ β → βRn].
An immediate consequence is:
Lemma 1 (Brouwer’s Continuity Principle, the case of disjunction).
For all P0, P1 ⊆ N , if ∀α[α ∈ P0 ∨ α ∈ P1], then
∀α∃m[∀β[αm ⊏ β → β ∈ P0] ∨ ∀β[αm ⊏ β → β ∈ P1]].
Proof. Define R := {(α, n) | α ∈ Pn] and apply Axiom 1. 
Theorem 2. (i) (N ,=) |= ∀x¬∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)].
(ii) (N ,=) |= ¬∀x∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)].
Proof. (i) Let α be given and assume: ∀β[α = β ∨ ¬(α = β)].
Using Lemma 1, find m such that
either ∀β[αm ⊏ β → α = β] or ∀β[αm ⊏ β → ¬(α = β)].
Consider β := αm ∗ 〈α(m) + 1〉 ∗ 0 (for the first alternative) and β := α (for the
second one) and conclude that both alternatives are false.
(ii) This is an immediate consequence of (i). 
Definition 1.
For each n, we let ψn be the sentence ∃x0∃x1 . . . ∃xn[
∧
i<j<n ¬(xi = xj)].
Tinf := EQ ∪ {ψn | n ∈ ω}.
ψn expresses that a set has at least n+ 1 elements.
Note that, in classical mathematics, Tinf has only one complete extension.
Intuitionistically, however, Tinf has (at least) two positively different complete
extensions, Th
(
(N ,=)
)
and Th
(
(ω,=)
)
.
The next Theorem reflects the fact that, in classical model theory, all models of
Tinf are elementarily equivalent.
Theorem 3. The theory Tinf ∪ {∀x∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)]} has only one complete
extension.
Proof. For each n, consider the first n variables of our language: x0, x1, . . . , xn−1.
A formula ε = ε(x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) is called an equality type if and only if it is of
the form
∧
i<j<n σij where each σij either is the formula xi = xj or the formula
¬(xi = xj).
12 One may prove: for all structures (V0, R0), (V1, R1), both realizing
Tinf ∪{∀x∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)]}, for each formula ϕ = ϕ(x0, x1, . . . , xn−1), for each
equality type ε = ε(x0, x1, . . . , xn−1), (V0, R0) |= ∀x0∀x1 . . . ∀xn−1[ε→ ϕ] if and only
if (V1, R1) |= ∀x0∀x1 . . . ∀xn−1[ε→ ϕ]. The proof is by induction on the complexity
of the formula ϕ.
It follows that any two models (V0, R0), (V1, R1), both realizing
Tinf ∪ {∀x∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)]}, are elementarily equivalent. 
From here on, we restrict attention to infinite models of EQ, that is, to models
of Tinf . The hackneyed question to make a survey of models that are finite, or at
least not infinite, and of models for which one can not decide if they are finite or
infinite, is left for another occasion. That the job is not an easy one will be clear
to readers of [8].
12Inconsistent equality types may be annoying but do not cause difficulties.
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4. Spreads
Definition 2. Let β be given. β is called a spread-law, Spr(β), if and only if
∀s[β(s) = 0↔ ∃n[β(s ∗ 〈n〉) = 0]].
For every β, we define: Fβ := {α | ∀n[β(αn) = 0]}.
X ⊆ N is closed if and only if ∃β[X = Fβ].
X ⊆ N is a spread if and only if ∃β[Spr(β) ∧ X = Fβ].
If Spr(β) and β(〈 〉) 6= 0, then Fβ = ∅.
If Spr(β) and β(〈 〉) = 0, then Fβ is inhabited
13. One may define α such that
∀n[α(n) = µp[β(αn ∗ 〈p〉) = 0]] and observe: ∀n[β(αn) = 0], that is: α ∈ Fβ.
Is every closed set a spread?
Define β such that ∀s[β(s) = 0↔ ¬∀i < 99[d(n+ i) = 9]], where
d : N→ {0, 1, . . . , 9} is the decimal expansion of π.
If Fβ is a spread, that is ∃γ[Spr(γ) ∧ Fγ = Fβ], then either Fβ is inhabited
and ¬∃s∀i < 99[d(s+ i) = 9] or Fβ = ∅ and ¬¬∃s∀i < 99[d(s+ i) = 9].
For this β, the statement ‘Fβ is a spread’ thus turns out to be reckless.
Brouwer’s Continuity Principle enables one to obtain a stronger conclusion.
Theorem 4. ¬∀β∃γ[Spr(γ) ∧ Fγ = Fβ ].
Proof. Assume: ∀β∃γ[Spr(γ) ∧ Fγ = Fβ]. Then ∀β[∃α[α ∈ Fβ] ∨ ¬∃α[α ∈ Fβ ]].
Using Lemma 1, find m such that either ∀β[0m ⊏ β → ∃α[α ∈ Fβ]] or
∀β[0m ⊏ β → ¬∃α[α ∈ Fβ]]. Both alternatives are false, as we see by considering
β = 0m ∗ 1 (for the first alternative), and β = 0 (for the second one). 
Lemma 5 (Brouwer’s Continuity Principle extends to spreads).
Let β be given such that Spr(β). Then, for all R ⊆ N × ω,
if ∀α ∈ Fβ∃n[αRn], then ∀α ∈ Fβ∃m∃n∀γ ∈ Fβ [αm ⊏ γ → γRn].
Proof. Assume: Spr(β). If β(〈 〉) 6= 0, then Fβ = ∅ and there is nothing to prove.
Assume β(〈 〉) = 0. Define σ such that σ(〈 〉) = 〈 〉 and, for all s, for all n,
(1) if β(s ∗ 〈n〉) = 0, then σ(s ∗ 〈n〉) = s ∗ 〈n〉, and,
(2) if β(s ∗ 〈n〉) 6= 0, then σ(s ∗ 〈n〉) = σ(s) ∗ 〈µp[β
(
σ(s) ∗ 〈p〉
)
= 0]〉.
Note: ∀s[β
(
σ(s)
)
= 0] and ∀s∀t[s ⊏ t→ σ(s) ⊏ σ(t)].
Define ρ : N → N such that ∀α∀n[σ(αn) ⊏ ρ|α].
Note: ∀α[ρ|α ∈ Fβ] ∧ ∀α ∈ Fβ[ρ|α = α].
The function ρ is called a retraction of N onto Fβ .
Now assume: ∀α ∈ Fβ∃n[αRn]. Conclude: ∀α∃n[(ρ|α)Rn].
Let α in Fβ be given. Using Axiom 1, find m,n such that
∀γ[αm ⊏ γ → (ρ|γ)Rn]. Conclude: ∀γ ∈ Fβ[αm ⊏ γ → γRn].
We thus see: ∀α ∈ Fβ∃m∃n∀γ ∈ Fβ [γm ⊏ α→ γRn]. 
Recall that, for all α, β, α # β ↔ α ⊥ β ↔ ∃n[α(n) 6= β(n)], and
α = β ↔ ∀n[α(n) = β(n)]↔ ¬(α # β), and α 6= β ↔ ¬∀n[α(n) = β(n)].
The constructive apartness relation # is more useful than the negative inequality
relation 6=.
Markov’s Principle, in the form: ∀α[¬¬∃n[α(n) = 0] → ∃n[α(n) = 0]]14, is
equivalent to the statement that the two relations coincide: ∀α∀β[α 6= β → α # β].
The intuitionistic mathematician does not accept Markov’s Principle.
Definition 3. We let AP = AP (x, y) be the formula ∀z[¬(z = x) ∨ ¬(z = y)].
13X ⊆ N is inhabited if and only if ∃α[α ∈ X ].
14A.A. Markov enuntiated this principle for primitive recursive α only.
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The following theorem reformulates a well-known fact.
Theorem 6 (Apartness is definable). For all β such that Spr(β),
for all α, δ in Fβ, α # δ if and only if (Fβ ,=) |= AP [α, δ].
Proof. First, assume α # δ. Find n such that αn 6= δn. Note: for every γ in
Fβ, either : γn 6= αn and γ # α, or : γn 6= δn and γ # δ. Conclude: (Fβ ,=) |=
AP [α, δ].
Next, assume (Fβ ,=) |= AP [α, δ], that is ∀γ ∈ Fβ[γ 6= α ∨ γ 6= δ].
Applying Lemma 5, find m such that either ∀γ ∈ Fβ [αm ⊏ γ → γ 6= α] or
∀γ ∈ Fβ [αm ⊏ γ → γ 6= δ]. The first alternative is clearly wrong (take γ := α).
The second alternative implies: αm ⊥ δ (if αm ⊏ δ, one could take γ := δ), and
thus: α # δ. 
Definition 4.
For each n, we let ψ+n be the sentence ∃x0∃x1 . . . ∃xn[
∧
i<j<n AP (xi, xj)].
T+inf := EQ ∪ {ψ
+
n | n ∈ ω}.
ψ+n expresses that a set has at least n+ 1 elements that are mutually apart.
Every model of T+inf realizes Tinf . In the second part of the paper we will meet
a structure that realizes Tinf but not T
+
inf , see Theorem 25 in Section 9.
The theory T+inf∪{∀x∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)]} has only one complete extension, the
same as the one and only complete extension of Tinf ∪ {∀x∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)]},
see Theorem 3.
5. Spreads with a decidable equality
Definition 5. We let D = D(x) be the formula: ∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)].
Definition 6. Assume Spr(β) and α ∈ Fβ.
α is an isolated point of Fβ if and only if ∃n∀γ ∈ Fβ [αn ⊏ γ → α = γ], or,
equivalently, ∃n∀s[
(
αn ⊏ s ∧ β(s) = 0
)
→ s ⊏ α].
α is a decidable point of Fβ if and only if ∀γ ∈ Fβ [α = γ ∨ ¬(α = γ)], or,
equivalently, (Fβ ,=) |= D[α].
I(Fβ) is the set of the isolated points of Fβ.
Cantor called I(Fβ) the adherence of Fβ.
Lemma 7. Assume Spr(β).
(i) For each α in Fβ, α is an isolated point of Fβ if and only if α is a decidable
point of Fβ.
(ii) I(Fβ) is a definable subset of Fβ.
Proof. (i) Let α be an isolated point of Fβ.
Find n such that ∀γ ∈ Fβ[αn ⊏ γ → α = γ].
Note: for each γ in Fβ , either αn ⊏ γ and α = γ, or αn ⊥ γ and α 6= γ.
Conclude: ∀γ ∈ Fβ [α = γ ∨ ¬(α = γ)], that is: α is a decidable point of Fβ.
Now assume: α is a decidable point of Fβ, that is: ∀γ ∈ Fβ [α = γ ∨ ¬(α = γ)].
Apply Lemma 5 and find m such that either ∀γ ∈ Fβ [αm ⊏ γ → α = γ] or
∀γ ∈ Fβ[αm ⊏ γ → ¬(α = γ)]. As the second alternative does not hold (take
γ = α), conclude: ∀γ ∈ Fβ [αm ⊏ γ → α = γ], and: α is an isolated point of Fβ.
(ii) Using (i), note: I(Fβ) = {α ∈ Fβ | (Fβ,=) |= D[α]}. 
Definition 7. Assume Spr(β) and α ∈ Fβ.
α is a limit point of Fβ if and only if ∀n∃δ ∈ Fβ[αn ⊏ δ ∧ α ⊥ δ], or,
equivalently, ∀n∃s[αn ⊏ s ∧ β(s) = 0 ∧ αn ⊥ s].
L(Fβ) is the set of the limit points of Fβ.
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Cantor called L(Fβ) the coherence of Fβ .
Lemma 8. ∀β[Spr(β)→ L(Fβ) ⊆ Fβ \ I(Fβ)], that is:
in all spreads, every limit point is a non-isolated point.
Proof. Obvious. 
Theorem 9. The following are equivalent:
(i) Markov’s Principle: ∀α[¬¬∃n[α(n) = 0]→ ∃n[α(n) = 0]].
(ii) ∀β[Spr(β)→ Fβ \ I(Fβ) ⊆ L(Fβ)], that is:
in all spreads, every non-isolated point is a limit point.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Let β be given such that Spr(β). Assume α is not an isolated
point of Fβ , that is: ¬∃n∀s[
(
αn ⊏ s ∧ β(s) = 0
)
→ s ⊏ α].
Let n be given. Define δ such that ∀s[δ(s) = 0↔ (αn ⊏ s ∧ β(s) = 0 ∧ s ⊥ α)].
Then ¬∀s[δ(s) 6= 0] and: ¬¬∃s[δ(s) = 0].
Using Markov’s Principle, we conclude: ∃s[δ(s) = 0].
We thus see: ∀n∃s[αs ⊏ s ∧ β(s) = 0 ∧ s ⊥ α], and: α is a limit point of Fβ .
(ii) ⇒ (i). Let us assume: ∀β[Spr(β)→ Fβ \ I(Fβ) ⊆ L(Fβ)],
Let α be given such that ¬¬∃n[α(n) = 0].
Define β such that ∀s[β(s) = 0↔ ∀m < length(s)[s(m) 6= 0→ ∃n ≤ m[α(n) = 0]]].
Note: Spr(β) and 0 ∈ Fβ, and: if ∃n[α(n) = 0], then 0 is a limit point of Fβ .
Conclude: if 0 is an isolated point of Fβ , then ¬∃n[α(n) = 0].
As ¬¬∃n[α(n) = 0], conclude: 0 is not an isolated point of Fβ .
By our assumption, 0 thus is a limit point of Fβ.
Find s such that β(s) = 0 and s ⊥ 0. Conclude: ∃n ≤ length(s)[α(n) = 0].
Conclude: ∀α[¬¬∃n[α(n) = 0]→ ∃n[α(n) = 0]], that is: Markov’s Principle. 
We thus see that the converse of Lemma 8, being equivalent to Markov’s Prin-
ciple, is not an intuitionistic theorem.
We could not answer the question if, in general, L(Fβ) is a definable subset of
(Fβ ,=). In some special cases, however, it is, and the following definition is useful.
Definition 8. Assume Spr(β). Fβ is called transparent if and only if there exists
γ such that Spr(γ) and Fγ = L(Fβ) and ∀α ∈ Fβ [∃n[γ(αn) 6= 0]→ α ∈ I(Fβ)].
Note that, for each β such that Spr(β), if Fβ is transparent, then
Fβ \ I(Fβ) ⊆ L(Fβ). The statement that every spread Fβ is transparent thus is
seen to imply Markov’s Principle.
In Section 7 we will see many examples of transparent spreads.
The fact that not every spread is a transparent spread is one of the reasons that
Brouwer did not succeed in finding a nice intuitionistic version of Cantor’s Main
Theorem15, see [1].
Definition 9. Let β satisfy Spr(β) and let ϕ be given.
We define: ϕ : Fβ → ω if and only if ∀α ∈ Fβ∃p[ϕ(αp) 6= 0].
If ϕ : Fβ → ω, then we define, for each α in Fβ, ϕ(α) as the number z such that
ϕ(αq) = z + 1, where q = µp[ϕ(αp) 6= 0].
We define: ϕ is an injective map from Fβ into ω, notation: ϕ : Fβ →֒ ω,
if and only if ϕ : Fα → ω and ∀α ∈ Fβ∀δ ∈ Fβ [α # δ → ϕ(α) 6= ϕ(δ)].
We define: ϕ : Fβ → N if and only if ∀n[ϕ
n : Fβ → ω].
If ϕ : Fβ → N , then we define, for each α in Fβ, ϕ|α as the element δ of N
such that ∀n[δ(n) = ϕn(α)].
15Cantor’s Main Theorem nowadays is called the Perfect Set Theorem: every closed subset of
N is the union of a perfect set and an at most countable set.
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We define: ϕ is an injective map from Fβ into N , notation: ϕ : Fβ →֒ N ,
if and only if ϕ : Fα → N and ∀α ∈ Fβ∀δ ∈ Fβ[α # δ → ϕ|α # ϕ|δ].
For every X ⊆ N , Fβ embeds into X if and only if there exists an injective map
from Fβ into X .
The following axiom is, at least at first sight, a little bit stronger than Brouwer’s
Continuity Principle.
Axiom 2 (First Axiom of Continuous Choice). For all R ⊆ N × ω,
if ∀α∃n[αRn], then ∃ϕ : N → ω∀α[αRϕ(α)].
Lemma 10 (The First Axiom of Continuous Choice extends to spreads).
Let β be given such that Spr(β). Then, for all R ⊆ Fβ × ω,
if ∀α ∈ Fβ∃n[αRn], then ∃ϕ : Fβ → ω∀α ∈ Fβ[αRϕ(α)].
Proof. Assume: Spr(β) and β(〈 〉) = 0. As in the proof of Lemma 5, define
ρ : N → Fβ such that ∀α[ρ|α ∈ Fβ ] ∧ ∀α ∈ Fβ [ρ|α = α].
Now assume ∀α ∈ Fβ∃n[αRn]. Conclude: ∀α∃n[(ρ|α)Rn].
Applying Axiom 2, find ϕ : N → ω such that ∀γ[(ρ|γ)Rϕ(γ)].
Conclude: ϕ : Fβ → ω and ∀γ ∈ Fβ [γRϕ(γ)]. 
Theorem 11. Assume Spr(β). (Fβ ,=) |= ∀x[D(x)] if and only if ∃ϕ[ϕ : Fβ →֒ ω].
Proof. First assume: (Fβ,=) |= ∀x[D(x)]. Then, by Lemma 7,
∀α ∈ Fβ∃n∀γ ∈ Fβ [αn ⊏ γ → α = γ]. Using Lemma 10, find ϕ : Fβ → ω such
that ∀α ∈ Fβ∀γ ∈ Fβ[αϕ(α) ⊏ γ → α = γ]. Define ψ : Fβ → ω such that
∀α ∈ Fβ[ψ(α) = αϕ(α)]. Clearly, ψ : Fβ →֒ ω.
Now assume: ϕ : Fβ →֒ ω. Note: ∀α ∈ Fβ∀δ ∈ Fβ[α = δ ↔ ϕ(α) = ϕ(δ)].
Also: ∀α ∈ Fβ∀δ ∈ Fβ[ϕ(α) = ϕ(δ) ∨ ¬
(
ϕ(α) = ϕ(δ)
)
].
Therefore: ∀α ∈ Fβ∀δ ∈ Fβ[α = δ ∨ ¬(α = δ)]. Conclude: (Fβ,=) |= ∀x[D(x)].

Definition 10. Assume Spr(β). Fβ is enumerable if and only if either Fβ = ∅ or
∃δ[∀n[δn ∈ Fβ] ∧ ∀α ∈ Fβ∃n[α = δn]].
Lemma 12. Assume Spr(β). Fβ is enumerable if and only if ∃ϕ[ϕ : Fβ →֒ ω].
Proof. Assume Fβ is enumerable and β(〈 〉) = 0.
Find δ such that ∀n[δn ∈ Fβ] and ∀α ∈ Fβ∃n[α = δn].
Using Lemma 10, find ϕ : Fβ → ω such that ∀α ∈ Fβ[α = δϕ(α)].
Note: ϕ : Fβ →֒ ω.
Now assume: ϕ : Fβ →֒ ω.
We make a preliminary observation.
Let s, n be given such that β(s) = 0 and ϕ(s) = n+ 1 and ∀t ⊏ s[ϕ(t) = 0].
Note: ∀α ∈ Fβ[s ⊏ α→ ϕ(α) = n] and, therefore:
∀α ∈ Fβ∀δ ∈ Fβ[(s ⊏ α ∧ s ⊏ δ)→ α = δ].
Now let γ be the element of Fβ satisfying ∀n[γ(n) := µp[β(γn ∗ 〈p〉) = 0]].
Define δ such that, for all s, if β(s) = 0 and ϕ(s) 6= 0 and ∀t ⊏ s[ϕ(t) = 0], then
s ⊏ δs and δs ∈ Fβ , and if not, then δs = γ.
Note: ∀s[δs ∈ Fβ] and ∀α ∈ Fβ∃s[α = δs]. 
Corollary 13. Assume Spr(β).
(Fβ ,=) |= ∀x[D(x)] if and only if Fβ is enumerable.
Proof. Use Theorem 11 and Lemma 12. 
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6. Spreads with exactly one undecidable point
Definition 11. We let τ2 be the element of C satisfying:
∀s[τ2(s) = 0↔ ∀i < length(s)[s(i) < 2 ∧
(
i+ 1 < length(s)→ s(i) ≤ s(i + 1)
)
]].
We define: T2 := Fτ2 .
Note: τ2 is a spread-law and T2 is a spread.
Let us take a closer look at T2.
Observe: ∀α[α ∈ T2 ↔ ∀i[α(i) ≤ α(i + 1) < 2]].
For each n, we define n∗ := 0n ∗ 1.
The infinite sequence 0, 0∗, 1∗, 2∗, . . . is a list of elements of T2 and a classical
mathematician might think it is the list of all elements of T2. The intuitionistic
mathematician knows better. He defines α in T2 such that
∀n[α(n) = 1↔ ∃k ≤ n∀i < 99[d(k + i) = 9]],
where d : N→ {0, 1, . . . , 9} is the decimal expansion of π. As yet, one has no proof
of the statement ‘α = 0’, as this statement implies: ∀k∃i < 99]d(k + i) = 9]. As
yet, one also has no proof of the statement: ‘∃n[α = n∗]’ as this statement implies:
∃n∀i < 99[d(n+ i) = 9]. The statement that α occurs in the above list is a reckless
one.
For each n, n∗ is an isolated and a decidable point of T2, and 0 is a non-isolated
and an undecidable point of T2. It follows, by Lemma 7 and Corollary 13, that T2 is
not an enumerable spread. In particular, the statement that the list 0, 0∗, 1∗, 2∗, . . .
is a complete list of the elements of T2, leads to a contradiction, as appears again
from the following Theorem.
Theorem 14. (i) ¬∀α ∈ T2[α = 0 ∨ ∃n[α = n∗]].
(ii) ∀α ∈ T2[α # 0→ ∃n[α = n∗]].
Proof. (i) Assume ∀α ∈ T2[α = 0 ∨ ∃n[α = n
∗]]. Using Lemma 5, find m,n such
that either ∀α ∈ T2[0m ⊏ α → α = 0] or ∀α ∈ T2[0m ⊏ α → α = n∗]. Note that
both alternatives are false.
Conclude: ¬∀α ∈ T2[α = 0 ∨ ∃n[α = n∗]].
(ii) Let α in T2 be given such that α # 0. Define n := µm[α(m+ 1) ⊥ 0]. Note:
α(n+ 1) = 0n ∗ 〈1〉 and α = n∗. 
Definition 12. Assume Spr(β). Fβ is almost-enumerable if and only if either
Fβ = ∅ or ∃δ[∀n[δn ∈ Fβ ] ∧ ∀α ∈ Fβ∀ε∃n[αε(n) = δnε(n)]].
This definition deserves some explanation. If Fβ is almost-enumerable and in-
habited, we are able to come forward with an infinite sequence δ0, δ1, . . . of el-
ements of Fβ such that, for every α in Fβ, every attempt ε to prove that α is
apart from all elements of the infinite sequence δ0, δ1, . . ., (ε expresses the guess:
∀n[αε(n) ⊥ δnε(n)]), will positively fail.
Almost-enumerable spreads are studied in [13, Section 9], where they are called
almost-countable located and closed subsets of N .
Theorem 15. T2 is almost-enumerable.
Proof. Define δ such that δ0 = 0 and, for each n. δn+1 = n∗ = 0n ∗ 1. Note:
∀n[δn ∈ T2]. Let ε be given. If αε(0) = δ0ε(0), we are done. If not, then α ⊥ 0 and
we may determine n such that α = δn+1 and αε(n+ 1) = δn+1ε(n+ 1). 
Axiom 3 (Second Axiom of Countable Choice).
For every R ⊆ N×N , if ∀n∃α[nRα], then ∃α∀n[nRαn].
Theorem 16. (i) (T2,=) |= ∃x[¬D(x) ∧ ∀y[AP (x, y)→ D(y)]].
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(ii) For all β such that Spr(β),
if (Fβ,=) |= ∃x[¬D(x) ∧ ∀y[AP (x, y)→ D(y)]], then Fβ embeds into T2.
Proof. (i) 0 is not an isolated point of T2, and, therefore, not a decidable point of T2.
Also, by Theorem 14(ii), ∀α ∈ T2[α # 0→ ∃n[α = n∗]], and, for each n, for each α
in T2, α = n∗ ↔ 0n ∗ 〈1〉 ⊏ α, so one may decide: α = n∗ or ¬(α = n∗), and: n∗ is
a decidable point of T2. We thus see: (T2,=) |= ¬D(x) ∧ ∀y[AP (x, y)→ D(y)][0],
and are done.
(ii) Assume: Spr(β) and (Fβ ,=) |= ∃x[¬D(x) ∧ ∀y[AP (x, y)→ D(y)]].
Find α in Fβ such that α is not an isolated point of Fβ.
Note: for each s such that β(s) = 0, the set Fβ ∩ s := {δ ∈ Fβ | s ⊏ δ} is a
spread, and, if s ⊥ α, then Fβ ∩ s consists of isolated points of Fβ ∩ s only, and
thus, by Theorem 11, embeds into ω.
Using Axiom 3, we find ϕ such that, for each s, if β(s) = 0 and there exist n, i
such that s = αn ∗ 〈i〉 and i 6= α(n), then ϕs : Fβ ∩ s →֒ ω.
We now define ψ : Fβ → T2 such that ψ|α = 0 and, for each δ in Fβ , if δ # α,
then ψ|δ = 0
(
δn, ϕδn(δ)
)
∗ 1 where n := µi[δi ⊥ α]. 
7. More and more undecidable points: the toy spreads
Definition 13. For each n, we let τn be the element of C satisfying:
∀s[τn(s) = 0↔ ∀i < length(s)[s(i) < n ∧
(
i+ 1 < length(s)→ s(i) ≤ s(i+ 1)
)
]].
We also define: Tn := Fτn .
For each n, τn is a spread-law and Tn and Tn = {α | ∀i[α(i) ≤ α(i + 1) < n]} is
a spread.
In this paper, the spreads T0, T1, . . . will be called the toy spreads.
Note: T0 = ∅ and T1 = {0}.
Definition 14. For each s 6= 〈 〉, we let s† be the element of N satisfying s ⊏ s†
and ∀i ≥ length(s)[s†(i) = s†(i − 1)].
Note that, for each n, for each s, if s 6= 〈 〉 and τn(s) = 0, then s† ∈ Tn.
Theorem 17. For each n > 0, Tn is almost-enumerable.
Proof. Let n > 0 be given. Define δ such that, for each s, if s 6= 〈 〉 and τn(s) = 0,
then δs = s†, and if not, then δs = 0.
We claim: ∀α ∈ Tn∀ε∃s[αε(s) = δsε(s)].
We establish this claim by proving, for each k < n,
∀α ∈ Tn[∃i[α(i) ≥ k] → ∀ε∃s[αε(s) = δsε(s)]], and we do so by backwards induc-
tion, starting with the case k = n− 1.
The case k = n− 1 is treated as follows. If ∃i[α(i) = n− 1], find
i0 := µi[α(i) = n− 1] and consider s := α(i0 + 1).
Note: α = s† = δs and, therefore, for every ε: αε(s) = δsε(s).
Now assume k < n− 1 is given such that
∀α ∈ Tn[∃i[α(i) ≥ k + 1]→ ∀ε∃s[αε(s) = δsε(s)]].
We have to prove: ∀α ∈ Tn[∃i[α(i) = k]→ ∀ε∃s[αε(s) = δsε(s)]].
Let α be given such that ∃i[α(i) = k]. Let also ε be given.
Define i0 := µi[α(i) = k] and define s := α(i0 + 1).
There are two cases to consider.
Case (i): αε(s) = s†ε(s) = δsε(s). We are done.
Case (ii): αε(s) ⊥ s†ε(s). Then ∃i < ε(s)[α(i) ≥ k + 1].
Using the induction hypothesis, we conclude: ∃s[αε(s) = δsε(s)]. 
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Theorem 18.
(i) For each n, for all α in Tn, α ∈ I(Tn) if and only if ∃m[α(m) + 1 = n].
(ii) For each n, Tn+1 \ I(Tn+1) = Tn = L(Tn+1).
(iii) For each n, Tn = {α ∈ Tn+1 | (Tn+1,=) |= ¬D[α]}.
Proof. The proof uses Lemma 7 and is left to the reader. 
Definition 15. We define an infinite sequence D0, D1, . . . of formulas, as follows.
D0 := ∀y[x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)],
D1 := ¬D0(x) ∧ ∀y[¬D0(y)→
(
x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)
)
],
D2 := ¬D0(x) ∧ ¬D1(x) ∧ ∀y[
(
¬D0(y) ∧ ¬D1(y)
)
→
(
x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)
)
],
and, more generally for each m > 0,
Dm :=
∧
i<m ¬Di(x) ∧ ∀y[
(∧
i<m ¬Di(y)
)
→
(
x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)
)
].
We also define, for each m > 0, sentences ψm and ρm, as follows:
ψm := ∃x[Dm(x)] and ρm := ∃x[Dm(x) ∧ ∀y[Dm(y)→ y = x]].
Definition 16. Assume Spr(β). α in Fβ is a limit point of order 0 of Fβ if and
only if α is an isolated point of Fβ.
For each m, α is a limit point of order m + 1 of Fβ if and only if, for each p,
there exists a limit point γ of order m such that αp ⊏ γ and α ⊥ γ.
Assume n > 0 and α ∈ Tn. Note the following:
(1) (Tn,=) |= D0[α] if and only if α is an isolated point of Tn if and only if
either: n = 1 or: n > 1 and ∃p[α(p) = n− 1].
(2) (Tn,=) |= ¬D0[α] if and only if α is a limit point (of order 1) of Tn if and
only if n > 1 and α ∈ Tn−1.
(3) (Tn,=) |= D1[α] if and only if α is an isolated point among the limit points
(of order 1) of Tn if and only if n > 1 and α ∈ Tn−1 and ∃p[α(p) = n− 2].
(4) (Tn,=) |= ¬D0 ∧ ¬D1[α], if and only if α is a limit point of order 2 of Tn
if and only if n > 2 and α ∈ Tn−2.
(5) For each m > 0, (Tn,=) |= D2[α] if and only if α is an isolated point
among the limit points of order 2 if and only if n > 2 and α ∈ Tn−2 and
∃p[α(p) = n− 3].
(6) For each m > 0, (Tn,=) |=
∧
i<m ¬Di[α] if and only if α is a limit point of
order m of Tn if and only if n > m and α ∈ Tn−m.
(7) For each m > 0, (Tn,=) |= Dm[α] if and only if α is an isolated point
among the limit points of order m if and only if n > m and α ∈ Tn−m and
∃p[α(p) = n−m− 1].
(8) For each m > 0, Tn |= ψm if and only if Tn contains an isolated point of
Tn−m if and only if n > m.
(9) For each m > 0, Tn |= ρm if and only if Tn contains exactly one isolated
point of Tn−m if and only if Tn−m = {0} if and only if n = m+ 1.
After these preliminary observations, the following Theorem is easy to under-
stand:
Theorem 19.
(i) For each n, Tn is a transparent
16 spread and,
if n > 0, then I(Tn) = {α ∈ Tn | ∃p[α(p) + 1 = n]} and L(Tn) = Tn−1.
(ii) For all n, for all m > 0, Tn = {α ∈ Tn+m | (Tn+m,=) |=
∧
i<m ¬Di[α]}.
(iii) For all m, {0} = T1 = {α ∈ Tm+1 | (Tm+1,=) |=
∧
i<m ¬Di[α]}.
(iv) For all n > 0, for all m > 0, (Tn,=) |= ψm if and only if m+ 1 ≤ n.
(v) For all n > 0, for all m > 0, (Tn,=) |= ρm if and only if m+ 1 = n.
16See Definition 8.
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Proof. Use the preliminary observations preceding this Theorem. 
Corollary 20. For all n,m, if n 6= m, then there exists a sentence ψ such that
(Tm,=) |= ψ and (Tn,=) |= ¬ψ.
8. Finite and infinite sums of toy spreads
8.1. A main result.
Definition 17. Assume Spr(β), Spr(γ).
We define: Fβ ⊎ Fγ := {〈0〉 ∗ δ | δ ∈ Fβ} ∪ {〈1〉 ∗ δ | δ ∈ Fγ}.
For each m, we define: m⊗ Fβ := {〈i〉 ∗ δ | i < m, δ ∈ Fβ}.
We also define: ω ⊗Fβ := {〈i〉 ∗ δ | i ∈ ω, δ ∈ Fβ}.
Note that Fβ ⊎ Fγ, m⊗Fβ and ω ⊗Fβ are spreads again.
We also define, for all m,n > 0, sentences ψnm and ρ
n
m, as follows:
ψnm := ∃x0∃x1 . . . ∃xn−1[
∧
i<j<n[AP (xi, xj) ∧
∧
i<n
∧
j<m ¬D(xj)].
and ρnm := ∃x0∃x1 . . . ∃xn−1[
∧
i<j<n[AP (xi, xj) ∧
∧
i<n
∧
j<m ¬Dj(xi) ∧
∀z[
∧
j<m ¬Dj(z)→
∨
i<n z = xi]].
The sentence ψnm expresses: ‘there exist (at least) n limit points of order m that
are mutually apart ’.
The sentence ρnm expresses: ‘there exist exactly n limit points of order m that
are mutually apart ’.
Theorem 21. (i) For all m,n, p, q > 0,
(n⊗ Tm,=) |= ψqp if and only if either: p+ 1 < m or: p+ 1 = m and q ≤ n.
(ii) For all m,n, p, q > 0, (n⊗ Tm,=) |= ρqp if and only if p+ 1 = m and n = q.
(iii) For all m, p, q > 0, (ω ⊗ Tm,=) |= ψqp if and only if p < m.
Proof. (i) Note the following:
If p+ 1 < m and n > 0, then Tm and also n⊗ Tm contain infinitely many limit
points of order p that are mutually apart.
If p+ 1 = m and n > 0, then n⊗ Tm contains exactly n limit points of order p
that are mutually apart: the points 〈i〉 ∗ 0, where i < n, so (n⊗Tm,=) |= ψqp if and
only if q ≤ n.
If p < m, then ω × Tm contains infinitely many limit points of order p that are
mutually apart.
The proofs of (i), (ii) and (iii) follow easily from these observations. 
Definition 18.
For each k, for each s in ωk, we define: Ts =
⋃
i<k{〈i〉 ∗ δ | δ ∈ Ts(i)}.
For each α, we define: Tα :=
⋃
i{〈i〉 ∗ δ | δ ∈ Tα(i)}.
Definition 19. Let F0,F1 ⊆ N and assume ϕ : F0 → F1.
ϕ is a (surjective) map from F0 onto F1 if and only if ∀β ∈ F1∃α ∈ F0[ϕ|α = β].
F0 is equivalent to F1, notation: F0 ∼ F1, if and only if there exists ϕ : F0 → F1
that is both injective17 and surjective.
Theorem 22. (i) For each m, Tm ⊕ Tm+1 ∼ Tm+1.
(ii) For all m,n, if m < n, then Tm ⊕ Tn ∼ Tn.
(iii) For all k, for all s in ωk, there exist m,n such that Ts ∼ n⊗ Tm.
Proof. (i) Let m be given. Define ϕ : Tm ⊕ Tm+1 → Tm+1 such that, for all δ in
Tm, ϕ|〈0〉 ∗ δ = 〈1〉 ∗ S ◦ δ, and, for each δ in Tm+1, ϕ|〈1〉 ∗ δ = 〈0〉 ∗ δ. Clearly, ϕ is
a one-to-one function mapping Tm ⊕ Tm+1 onto Tm+1.
17See Definition 9.
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(ii) Let m be given. We use induction on n. The case n = m + 1 has been
treated in (i). Now let n be given such that m < n and Tm ⊕ Tn ∼ Tn. Then
Tm ⊕ Tn+1 ∼ Tm ⊕ (Tn ⊕ Tn+1) ∼ (Tm ⊕ Tn)⊕ Tn+1 ∼ Tn ⊕ Tn+1 ∼ Tn+1.
(iii) We use induction on k. If s ∈ ω0, then s = 〈 〉 and ∅ = Ts = 0⊗ T1.
Now let k be given such that for all s in ωk there existm,n such that Ts = n⊗Tm.
Let s = t ∗ 〈p〉 in ωk+1 be given. Find m,n such that Tt = n ⊗ Tm. Note:
Ts ∼ Tt ⊕ Tp and consider several cases.
Case (1): t = 〈 〉. Then Ts = 1⊗ Tp.
Case (2): t 6= 〈 〉 and p < m. Then, by (ii): Ts ∼ Tt ∼ n⊗ Tm.
Case (3): t 6= 〈 〉 and p = m. Then: Ts ∼ Tt ⊕ Tm ∼ (n+ 1)⊗ Tm.
Case (4): t 6= 〈 〉 and p > m. Then, by (ii):
Ts ∼ Tt ⊕ Tp ∼ Tm ⊕ . . .⊕ Tm︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
⊕Tp ∼ Tp ∼ 1⊗ Tp.

Theorem 23 (EQ has continuum many complete extensions18).
(i) For each α, I(Tα) =
⋃
i{〈i〉 ∗ δ | δ ∈ Tα(i) ∧ ∃p[δ(p) + 1 = α(i)]}.
(ii) For all α, for all n, (Tα,=) |= ψn if and only if ∃i[α(i) > n].
(iii) For all α, for all n, (Tα,=) |= ρn if and only if
∃i[α(i) = n+ 1 ∧ ∀j[α(j) = n+ 1→ i = j]].
(iv) For all ζ, η in [ω]ω, if ζ ⊥ η and ζ(0) = η(0) = 2,
then there exists a sentence ψ such that (Tζ ,=) |= ψ and (Tη,=) |= ¬ψ.
Proof. (i) Use Theorem 19(i).
(ii) Note that, for each α, for each n, (Tα,=) |= ψn if and only if Tα contains a
limit point of order n if and only if ∃i[α(i) > n].
(iii) Note that, for each α, for each n, (Tα,=) |= ρn if and only if Tα contains
exactly one limit point of order n if and only if
∃i[α(i) = n+ 1 ∧ ∀j[α(j) = n+ 1→ i = j]].
(iv) Using (iii), note that, for all ζ in [ω]ω, if ζ(0) > 1, then ∀n[(Tζ ,=) |= ρn if
and only if ∃p[ζ(p) = n+ 1].
Conclude that, for all ζ, η in [ω]ω, for all p, if ζ(0) = η(0) = 2 and ζ ⊥ η and
p := µi[ζ(i) 6= η(i)] and ζ(p) < η(p), then ¬∃i[η(i) = ζ(p)], and, therefore,
(Tζ ,=) |= ψζ(p)−1 and (Tη,=) |= ¬ψζ(p)−1. 
8.2. Finitary spreads suffice.
Definition 20. Assume Spr(β). β is called a finitary spread-law or a fan-law if
and only if ∃γ∀s[β(s) = 0→ ∀n[β(s ∗ 〈n〉) = 0→ n ≤ γ(s)]].
X ⊆ N is a fan if and only if there exists a fan-law β such that X = Fβ.
Note that the toy spreads T0, T1, . . . are fans.
The set Tα, however, is a spread but, in general, not a fan.
Define, for each α, T ∗α :=
⋃
n 0n ∗ 〈1〉 ∗ Tα(n).
19
Note that, for each α, T ∗α is a fan.
One may prove a statement very similar to Theorem 23(iv):
For all ζ, η in [ω]ω, if ζ ⊥ η and ζ(0) = η(0) = 2, then there exists
a sentence ψ such that (T ∗ζ ,=) |= ψ and (T
∗
η ,=) |= ¬ψ.
18Note that there exists an embedding ρ : C →֒ {ζ ∈ [ω]ω | ζ(0) = 2}.
19For each X ⊆ N , X := {α | ∀n∃β ∈ X [αn ⊏ β]} is the closure of X .⋃
n
0n ∗ 〈1〉 ∗ Tα(n), in general, is not a spread, but its closure is.
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8.3. Comparison with an older theorem. The first-order theory DLO of dense
linear orderings without endpoints is formulated in a first-order language with bi-
nary predicate symbols = and ⊏ and consists of the following axioms:
(1) ∀x[x ⊏ x],
(2) ∀x∀y∀z[(x ⊏ y ∧ y ⊏ z)→ x ⊏ z],
(3) ∀x∀y[
(
¬(x ⊏ y) ∧ ¬(y ⊏ x)
)
→ x = y].
(4) ∀x∀y[x ⊏ y→ ∀z[x ⊏ z ∨ z ⊏ y]],
(5) ∀x∃y[x ⊏ y] ∧ ∀x∃y[y ⊏ x],
(6) ∀x∀y[x ⊏ y→ ∃z[x ⊏ z ∧ z ⊏ y]], and
(7) axioms of equality.
(R,=R, <R) realizes DLO.
Let DLO− be the theory one obtains from DLO by leaving out axiom (4). If one
defines a relation <′R on R by: ∀x∀y[x <
′
R y ↔ ¬¬(x <R y)], then (R,=R, <
′
R)
realizes DLO− but not DLO.
In [6, Theorem 2.4] one constructs a function α 7→ Aα associating to each element
α of 2ω = C a subset Aα of the set R of the real numbers such that, for each α
in C, Aα is dense in (R, <R), and, for all α, β in C, if α ⊥ β, then there exists a
sentence ψ such that (Aα, <R) |= ψ and (Aβ , <R) |= ¬ψ.
Note: each structure (Aα, <R) realizes DLO. The (intuitionistic) theory DLO
thus has continuum many complete extensions. 20
Theorem 23(iii) strengthens this result.
One may obtain the result of 23(iii) with subsets of R as well as with subsets of
N . Define an infinite sequence U0,U1, . . . of subsets of R by:
U0 := ∅ and U1 := {0R}, and for each m > 0, Um+1 =
⋃
n
1
2n+1 +
1
2n+2 ·R Um.
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For each m, one may define ϕ : Tm → Um such that ϕ is surjective and satisfies:
∀δ ∈ Tm∀ζ ∈ Tm[δ ⊥ ζ ↔ ϕ|δ #R ϕ|ζ].
It follows that, for each m, the structures (Tm,=) and (Um,=R) are elementarily
equivalent.
Define, for each α in [ω]ω, Aα :=
⋃
n n+R Uα(n).
Note: for all α, β in [ω]ω, if α ⊥ β, then there exists a sentence ψ such that
(Aα,=R) |= ψ and (Aβ ,=R) |= ¬ψ.
We thus obtain from Theorem 23 a result similar to [6, Theorem 2.4], this time
using not the ordering relation <R but only the equality relation =R.
Note that the relation =R is definable in the structure (R, <R) as
∀x ∈ R∀y ∈ R[x =R y ↔
(
¬(x <R y) ∧ ¬(y <R x)
)
].
9. The Vitali equivalence relation
For all α, β, we define
α ∼V β ↔ ∃n∀m > n[α(m) = β(m)].
The relation ∼V will be called the Vitali equivalence relation.
This is because the relation ∼V on N resembles the relation ∼Q on the set R of
the real numbers defined by:
x ∼Q y ↔ ∃q ∈ Q[x−R y = q].
The relation ∼Q has played an important roˆle in classical set theory.
If one constructs, using the axiom of choice, within the interval [0, 1], a transver-
sal for this equivalence relation, that is: a complete set of mutually inequivalent
representatives, one obtains a set that is not Lebesgue measurable. This discovery
is due to G. Vitali.
20Classically, Th
(
(Q, <)
)
is the one and only complete extension of DLO.
21For each X ⊆ R, X := {x ∈ R | ∀n∃y ∈ X [|x− y| < 1
2n
]} is the closure of X .
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Note: (N ,∼V ) |= EQ.
The following theorem brings to light an important difference between (N ,=)
and (N ,∼V ).
Definition 21. A proposition P is stable if and only if ¬¬P → P .
A binary relation ∼ on N is stable if and and only if
∀α∀β[¬¬(α ∼ β)→ α ∼ β]22.
Theorem 24 (Equality is stable but the Vitali equivalence relation is not
stable).
(i) (N ,=) |= ∀x∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y].
(ii) (N ,∼V ) |= ∀x¬∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y].
Proof. (i) Note: for all α, β, α = β ↔ ¬(α # β), and, therefore:
¬¬(α = β)↔ ¬¬¬(α # β)↔ ¬(α # β)↔ α = β.
(ii) Let γ be given.
Consider Fγ := {α | ∀m∀n[
(
α(m) 6= γ(m) ∧ α(n) 6= γ(n)
)
→ m = n].
Fγ is the set of all α that differ at at most one place from γ.
Note that Fγ is a spread.
We have two claims.
First claim: ∀α ∈ Fγ [¬¬(α ∼V γ].
The proof is as follows. Let α in Fγ be given. Distinguish two cases.
Case (1). ∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)]. Find n such that α(n) 6= γ(n) and conclude:
∀m > n[α(m) = γ(m)] and α ∼V γ.
Case (2). ¬∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)]. Conclude: ∀n[α(n) = γ(n)] and α ∼V γ.
We thus see: if ∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)] ∨ ¬∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)], then α ∼V γ.
As ¬¬(∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)] ∨ ¬∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)]), also ¬¬(α ∼V γ).
Second claim: ¬∀α ∈ Fγ [α ∼ γ].
In order to see this, assume: ∀α ∈ Fγ [α ∼ γ], that is:
∀α ∈ F∃n∀m > n[α(m) = γ(m)]. Using Lemma 5, find p, n such that
∀α ∈ Fγ [γp ⊏ α → ∀m > n[α(m) = γ(m)]]. Define m := max(p, n + 1) and
define α such that ∀n[α(n) 6= γ(n) ↔ n = m]. Note: γp ⊏ α and m > n and
α(m) 6= γ(m). Contradiction.
Combining our two claims, we see:
not: for all α, if ¬¬(α ∼V γ) then α ∼V γ.
Conclude: (N ,∼V ) |= ∀x¬∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y]. 
It follows from Theorem 24 that there is no relation #V on N satisfying the
requirements of an apartness relation23 with respect to ∼V :
(i) ∀α∀β[¬(α #V β)↔ α ∼V β]
(ii) ∀α∀β[α #V β → β #V α]
(iii) ∀α∀β[α #V β → ∀γ[α #V γ ∨ γ #V β]].
The existence of an apartness #V would imply, by the first one of these require-
ments, that ∼V is a stable relation, as, for any proposition P , ¬¬¬P ↔ ¬P .
The next Theorem now is no surprise:
Theorem 25. (N ,∼V ) |= ∀x∀y[¬AP (x, y)].
22The term ‘stable’ has been introduced by D. Van Dantzig, who hoped to be able to reconstruct
‘classical’, non-intuitionistic mathematics within the stable part of intuitionistic mathematics, see
[3].
23See [5, p. 256]
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Proof. Let α, β be given.
Assume (N ,∼V ) |= AP [α, β], that is, ∀γ[γ ≁V α ∨ γ ≁V β].
Applying Lemma 1, find p such that
either ∀γ[αp ⊏ γ → γ ≁V α] or ∀γ[αp ⊏ γ → γ ≁V β].
The first of these two alternatives is wrong, as αp ⊏ α ∧ α ∼V α.
Conclude: ∀γ[αp ⊏ γ → γ ≁V β].
Define γ such that αp ⊏ γ and ∀i > p[γ(i) = β(i)].
Note: αp ⊏ γ ∧ γ ∼V β.
Contradiction.
Conclude: (N ,=V ) |= ¬AP [α, β].
We thus see: (N ,=V ) |= ∀x∀y[¬AP (x, y)]. 
Clearly, the relation defined by the formula AP in the structure (N ,∼V ) fails to
satisfy the first requirement for an apartness relation with respect to ∼V .
It follows from Theorem 25 that (N ,∼V ), while realizing Tinf , does not realize
T+inf , see Definitions 1 and 4.
10. A first Vitali variation
There are many intuitionistic versions of the classical Vitali equivalence relation.
This is obvious to someone who knows that there are many variations upon the
notion of a finite and decidable subset of N, see [8] and [11, Section 3].
Definition 22. We define an infinite sequence ∼0V ,∼
1
V , . . . of relations on N such
that ∼0V = ∼V and, for each i,
α ∼i+1V β ↔ ∃n∀m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)→ α ∼
i
V β].
We also define:
α ∼ωV β ↔ ∃i[α ∼
i
V β].
Theorem 26.
(i) ∀i∀n∀s ∈ ωn∀t ∈ ωn∀α∀β[s ∗ α ∼iV t ∗ β ↔ α ∼
i
V β].
(ii) ∀i∀α∀β[α ∼iV β → α ∼
i+1
V β].
(iii) ∀i∀γ¬∀α[α ∼i+1V γ → α ∼
i
V γ].
(iv) ∀i∀j∀α∀β∀γ[(α ∼iV β ∧ β ∼
j
V γ)→ α ∼
i+j
V γ].
(v) ∼ωV is an equivalence relation on N .
Proof. (i) One proves this easily by induction.
(ii) Obvious.
(iii) Let γ be given.
For each i, define Fγi := {α | ∀s ∈ [ω]
i+1∃j < i+ 1[α ◦ s(j) = γ ◦ s(j)]}.
Note: for each i, Fγi is a spread, and F
γ
i ( F
γ
i+1.
For each i, Fγi consists of all α that assume at most i times a value different
from the value assumed by γ. In particular, F0γ = {γ}.
Note: for all i,m, α, β,
if m = µn[α(n) 6= γ(n)] and α = α(m+ 1) ∗ β, then α ∈ Fγi+1 ↔ β ∈ F
γ
i .
We have two claims.
First claim: ∀i∀α ∈ Fγi [α ∼
i
V γ].
We prove this claim by induction.
The starting point of the induction is the observation:
∀α ∈ Fγ0 [α = γ], so ∀α ∈ F
γ
0 [α ∼
0
V γ].
Now assume i is given such that ∀α ∈ Fγi [α ∼
i
V γ].
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Assume α ∈ Fγi+1 and ∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)]. Find n such that α(n) 6= γ(n). Find β
such that α = α(n+1)∗β, and note: β ∈ Fγi and thus, by the induction hypothesis,
β ∼iV γ. Conclude, using (i): α ∼
i
V γ.
We thus see:
∀α ∈ Fγi+1[∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)]→ α ∼
i
V γ], that is: ∀α ∈ F
γ
i+1[α ∼
i+1
V γ].
This completes the proof of the induction step.
Second claim: ∀i¬∀α ∈ Fγi+1[α ∼
i
V γ].
We again use induction.
We first prove: ¬∀α ∈ Fγ1 [α ∼V γ].
Assume ∀α ∈ Fγ1 [α ∼V γ], that is: ∀α ∈ F1∃n∀m > n[α(m) = γ(m)].
Note: γ ∈ Fγ1 and F
1
γ is a spread.
Using Lemma 5, find p, n such that ∀α ∈ F1[γp ⊏ α → ∀m > n[α(m) = γ(m)].
Define m := max(n+1, p) and define α such that ∀n[α(n) = γ(n)↔ n 6= m]. Note:
α ∈ F1 and γp ⊏ α and α(m) 6= γ(m) and m > n. Contradiction.
Conclude: ¬∀α ∈ Fγ1 [α ∼V γ].
Now let i be given such that ¬∀α ∈ Fγi+1[α ∼
i
V γ].
We want to prove: ¬∀α ∈ Fγi+2[α ∼
i+1
V γ].
Assume: ∀α ∈ Fγi+2[α ∼
i+1
V γ], that is:
∀α ∈ Fγi+2∃n∀m > n[α(m) 6= γ(m) → α ∼
i+1
V γ]. Using Lemma 5, find p, n such
that ∀α ∈ Fγi+2[(γp ⊏ α ∧ m > n ∧ α(m) 6= γ(m)) → α ∼
i
V γ]. Define m :=
max(n + 1, p). Let β in Fγi+1 be given. Define α such that m = µn[α(n) 6= γ(n)]
and ∀n > m[α(n) = β(n)]. Note: α ∈ Fγi+2 and α(m) 6= γ(m) and m > n, so
α ∼iV γ, and, therefore, by (i), β ∼
i
V γ. We thus see: ∀β ∈ F
γ
i+1[β ∼
i
V γ] and, by
the induction hypothesis, obtain a contradiction.
This completes the proof of the induction step.
Taking our first and second claim together, we obtain the conclusion:
∀γ∀i¬∀α[α ∼i+1V γ → α ∼
i
V γ].
(iv) We have to prove:
for all i, for all j, ∀α∀β∀γ[(α ∼iV β ∧ β ∼
j
V γ)→ α ∼
i+j
V γ].
We use induction on i+ j and distinguish four cases.
Case (1): i = j = 0. Assume α ∼0V β and β ∼
0
V γ. Find n, p such that
∀m > n[α(m) = β(m)] and ∀m > p[β(m) = γ(m). Define q := max(n, p) and note:
∀m > q[α(m) = γ(m)]. Conclude: α ∼0V γ.
Case (2): i = 0 and j > 0. Assume α ∼0V β and β ∼
j
V γ. Find n, p such
that ∀m > n[α(m) = β(m)] and ∀m > p[β(m) 6= γ(m) → β ∼j−1V γ]. Define
q := max(n, p).
Assume m > q and note: if α(m) 6= γ(m), then β(m) 6= γ(m) and β ∼j−1V γ.
Using the induction hypothesis, conclude: α ∼j−1V γ.
We thus see: ∀m > q[α(m) 6= γ(m)→ α ∼j−1V γ], that is: α ∼
j
V γ.
Case (3): i > 0 and j = 0. Assume α ∼iV β and β ∼
0
V γ. Find n, p such
that ∀m > n[α(m) 6= β(m) → α ∼i−1V β] and ∀m > p[β(m) = γ(m)]. Define
q := max(n, p).
Assume m > q and note: if α(m) 6= γ(m), then α(m) 6= β(m) and α ∼i−1V β.
Using the induction hypothesis, conclude: α ∼i−1V γ.
We thus see: ∀m > q[α(m) 6= γ(m)→ α ∼i−1V γ], that is: α ∼
i
V γ.
Case (4): i > 0 and j > 0. Assume α ∼iV β and β ∼
j
V γ. Find n, p such that
∀m > n[α(m) 6= β(m) → α ∼i−1V β] and ∀m > p[β(m) 6= γ(m) → β ∼
j−1
V γ].
Define q := max(n, p).
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Assume m > q and α(m) 6= γ(m). Then either: α(m) 6= β(m) and α ∼i−1 β,
and, by the induction hypothesis, α ∼i+j−1V γ, or: β(m) 6= γ(m) and β ∼
j−1 γ
and, by the induction hypothesis, α ∼i+j−1 γ.
We thus see: ∀m > q[α(m) 6= γ(m)→ α ∼i+j−1 γ]. Conclude: α ∼i+j γ.
(v) is an easy consequence of (iv). 
The next Theorem shows that the structures (N ,∼V ) and (N ,∼ωV ) have a prop-
erty in common.
Theorem 27 (∼ωV is not stable).
(N ,∼ωV ) |= ∀x¬∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y].
Proof. Let γ be given.
We repeat a definition we gave in the proof of Theorem 26(iii).
For each i, Fγi := {α | ∀s ∈ [ω]
i+1∃j < i+ 1[α ◦ s(j) = γ ◦ s(j)]}.
In the proof of Theorem 26(iii), we saw: ∀i∀α ∈ Fγi [α ∼
i
V γ].
Conclude: ∀i∀α ∈ Fγi [α ∼
ω
V γ].
We now define: Fγω := {α | ∀i[i = µn[α(n) 6= γ(n)]→ α ∈ Fi+1]}.
Like each Fγi , F
γ
ω is a spread, and γ ∈ F
γ
ω .
We have two claims.
First claim: ∀α ∈ Fγω [¬¬(α ∼
ω
V γ)].
The argument is as follows. Let α in Fγω be given and distinguish two cases.
Case (1): ¬∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)]. Then α = γ and α ∼ωV γ.
Case (2): ∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)]. Find i := µn[α(n) 6= γ(n)]. Note: α ∈ Fγi+1 and
α ∼ωV γ.
As ¬¬(∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)] ∨ ¬∃n[α(n) 6= γ(n)]), also ¬¬(α ∼ωV γ).
Second claim: ¬∀α ∈ Fγω [α ∼
ω
V γ].
In order to see this, assume: ∀α ∈ Fγω [α ∼
ω
V γ], that is: ∀α ∈ Fω∃i[α ∼
i
V γ].
Using Lemma 5, find p, i such that ∀α ∈ Fγω [γp ⊏ α→ α ∼
i
V γ].
Define q := max(p, i+ 1). Let α in Fγq be given. Define β such that
∀n < q[β(n) = γ(n)] and β(q) 6= γ(q) and ∀n > q[β(n) = α(n)].
Note: β ∈ Fq+1 and q = µn[β(n) 6= γ(n)], and, therefore, β ∈ Fγω .
As γq ⊏ β, we conclude: β ∼iV γ.
As β ∼0V α, also α ∼
i
V γ.
We thus see: ∀α ∈ Fq[α ∼iV γ].
As q > i, this contradicts the Second claim in the proof of Theorem 26(iii).
Taking our two claims together, we conclude:
∀γ¬∀α ∈ Fγω [¬¬(α ∼
ω
V γ)→ α ∼
ω
V γ].
Conclude: (N ,∼ωV ) |= ∀x¬∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y]. 
We did not succeed in finding a sentence ψ such that (N ,∼V ) |= ψ and
(N ,∼ωV ) |= ¬ψ.
11. More and more Vitali relations
In [8], [9] and [11, Section 3], one studies the set
Fin := {α | α ∼V 0} = {α | ∃n∀m > n[α(m) = 0]}.
For each α, α ∈ Fin if and only if Dα := {m | α(m) 6= 0} is a finite subset of N.
For each i, the set {α | α ∼iV 0} is called, in [9] and [11], the i-th perhapsive
extension of the set Fin. It is shown, in [8], [9] and [11], that the process of building
perhapsive extensions of Fin can be carried on into the transfinite.
In a similar way, the Vitali equivalence relation ∼V admits of transfinitely many
extensions.
The relation ∼ωV is only a first extension of ∼V . Let us consider a second one.
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Recall: ∀α∀β[α ∼ωV β ∼ ∃i[α ∼
i
V β]].
Definition 23. We define an infinite sequence ∼ω+0V =∼
ω
V ,∼
ω+1
V ,∼
ω+2
V , . . . of re-
lations on N , such that, for each i > 0,
α ∼ω+i+1V β ↔ ∃n∀m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)→ α ∼
ω+i
V β].
We also define:
α ∼ω+ωV β ↔ ∃i[α ∼
ω+i
V β].
One may prove analogues of Theorems 26 and 27 and conclude:
∼ω+ωV is an equivalence relation on N , properly extending ∼
ω
V , that, like ∼V and
∼ωV , is not stable in the sense of Theorem 27.
One may continue and define ∼ω+ω+ωV , and ∼
ω+ω+ω+ω
V and so on.
The process of building such extensions leads further into the transfinite, as
follows.
Definition 24. Let R be binary relation on N .
We define a binary relation R+ on N by:
αR+β ↔ ∃n∀m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)→ αRβ].
We let E be the least class of binary relations on N such that
(i) the Vitali equivalence relation ∼V belongs to E, and,
(ii) for every R in E, also R+ ∈ E, and,
(iii) for every infinite sequence R0, R1, . . . of elements of E, also
⋃
iRi ∈ E.
The elements of E are the extensions of the Vitali equivalence relation.
Note that <ωV and <
ω+ω
V are in E .
In general, a relation R in E is not transitive. One may prove, for instance, that
the relation <1V , while belonging to E , is not transitive.
The next Theorem shows that E contains many transitive relations.
Theorem 28 (E contains many transitive relations). (i) ∼V is transitive.
(ii) Given any transitive R in E, there exists a transitive T in E such that R+ ⊆ T .
(iii) Given any infinite and increasing sequence R0 ⊆ R1 ⊆ . . . of transitive rela-
tions in E, also
⋃
iRi is a transitive relation in E.
Proof. (i) Obvious.
(ii) We take our inspiration from Theorem 26 (iv) and (v).
Let a transitive R in E be given.
Define an infinite sequence R0, R1, . . . of elements of E such that R0 = R and,
for each i, Ri+1 = (Ri)+.
One may prove: for all i, for all j, ∀α∀β∀γ[(αRiβ ∧ βRiγ)→ αRi+jγ], as it is
done for the special case R =∼V in the proof of Theorem 26(iv).
Define T :=
⋃
iR
i and note: T ∈ E , R+ ⊆ T and T is transitive.
(iii) Note: for every increasing sequence R0 ⊆ R1 ⊆ . . . of transitive relations on
N , also
⋃
iRi is transitive. 
Theorem 28 will gain significance after Corollary 32, which shows that, for every
R in E , R ⊆ R+ and ¬(R+ ⊆ R).
We did not succeed in proving that every R in E extends to a transitive T in E .
Definition 25. A binary relation R on N is shift-invariant if and only if
∀α∀β[αRβ ↔ (α ◦ S)R(β ◦ S)].
Lemma 29. Every R in E is shift-invariant.
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Proof. The proof is a straightforward exercise in induction on E . Note:
(I) ∼V is shift-invariant.
(II) For every binary relation R on N , if R is shift-invariant, then R+ is shift-
invariant.
(III) For every infinite sequence R0, R1, . . . of binary relations on N , if each Rn
is shift-invariant, then
⋃
iRi is shift-invariant.
Conclude: every R in E is shift-invariant. 
Definition 26. We let E∗ be the least class of binary relations on N such that
(i) the Vitali equivalence relation ∼V belongs to E∗, and
(ii) for every infinite sequence R0, R1, . . . of elements of E
∗, also (
⋃
iRi)
+ ∈ E∗.
Lemma 30. E∗ ⊆ E and, for all R in E, there exists T in E∗ such that R ⊆ T .
Proof. The proofs of the two statements are straightforward, by induction on E∗
and E , respectively. 
Theorem 31. For each R in E∗, R ⊆ R+ and ¬(R+ ⊆ R).
Proof. For each R in E , we define FinR := {α | αR0}.
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We prove for each R in E∗ there exists a fan F such that F ⊆ FinR+ and
¬(F ⊆ FinR).
We do so by induction on E∗.
(I) Define F := {α | ∀m∀n[(α(m) 6= 0 ∧ α(n) 6= 0)→ m = n]}.
Note that F is a fan.
For each α in F , for each n, if α(n) 6= 0 then: ∀m > n[α(m) = 0] and α ∈ Fin∼V .
Conclude: for each α ∈ F , if ∃n[α(n) 6= 0], then α ∈ Fin∼V , that is: α ∈ Fin(∼V )+ .
Conclude: F ⊆ Fin(∼V )+ .
Now assume F ⊆ Fin∼V , that is: ∀α ∈ F∃n∀m > n[α(m) = 0]. Using Lemma
5, find p, n such that ∀α ∈ F [0p ⊏ α→ ∀m > n[α(m) = 0]].
Define q := max(p, n+ 1) and consider α := 0q ∗ 〈1〉 ∗ 0. Contradiction.
Conclude: ¬(F ⊆ Fin∼V ).
(II) Let R0, R1, . . . be an infinite sequence of elements of E .
Let F0,F1, . . . be an infinite sequence of fans such that,
for each n, Fn ⊆ Fin(Rn)+ and ¬(Fn ⊆ FinRn).
Consider R := (
⋃
iRi)
+.
Define F := {α | ∀n[n = µi[α(i) 6= 0]→ ∃β ∈ Fn′ [α = α(n+ 1) ∗ β]}.
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Note that F is a fan.
We now prove: F ⊆ FinR+ and ¬(F ⊆ FinR).
Note that, for each α ∈ F , for each n, if n = µi[α(i) 6= 0], then there exists β in
Fn′ such that α = α(n+ 1) ∗ β.
As, for each n, Fn ⊆ Fin(Rn)+ ⊆ Fin
⋃
i
(Ri)+ , and
⋃
i(Ri)
+ ⊆
(⋃
iRi
)+
= R
and R is shift-invariant, conclude: ∀α ∈ F [∃n[α(n) 6= 0] → α ∈ FinR], that is:
F ⊆ FinR+ .
Now assume F ⊆ FinR, that is: ∀α ∈ F∃n∀m > n[α(m) 6= 0]→ ∃i[α ∈ FinRi ]].
Using Lemma 5, find p, n such that
∀α ∈ F [0p ⊏ α→ ∀m > n[α(m) 6= 0→ ∃i[α ∈ FinRi ]].
Define q := max(p, n+ 1) and note: ∀α ∈ F [0q ∗ 〈1〉 ⊏ α→ ∃i[α ∈ Fi]].
Using Lemma 5 again, find r, i such that ∀α ∈ F [0q ∗ 〈1〉 ∗ 0r ⊏ α→ α ∈ Fi].
Find n ≥ q + r + 1 such that n′ = i and define t := n− (q + 1).
24In [8], X ⊆ N is called a notion of finiteness if Fin ⊆ X ⊆ Fin¬¬. For every R in E, F inR
is a notion a finiteness.
25For each n, n = (n′, n′′), see Section 13.
20
Note: t ≥ r and conclude: ∀β ∈ Fi[0q ∗ 〈1〉 ∗ 0t ∗ 〈1〉 ∗ β ∈ FinRi].
As Ri is shift-invariant, conclude: Fi ⊆ FinRi .
Contradiction, as ¬(Fi ⊆ FinRi).
Conclude: ¬(F ⊆ FinR). 
Corollary 32. For each R in E, R ⊆ R+ and ¬(R+ ⊆ R).
Proof. Assume we find R in E such that R = R+.
Conclude, by induction on E : for all U in E , U ⊆ R.
Using Lemma 30, find T in E∗ such that R ⊆ T .
By Theorem 31, T ⊆ T+ and ¬(T+ ⊆ T ).
On the other hand, T+ ⊆ R ⊆ T .
Contradiction. 
Definition 27. We define binary relations ∼¬¬V and ∼
almost
V on N , as follows.
For all α, β, α ∼¬¬V β ↔ ¬¬∃n∀m > n[α(n) = β(n)]↔ ¬¬(α ∼V β), and
α ∼almostV β ↔ ∀ζ ∈ [ω]
ω∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = β ◦ ζ(n)].
α ∼almostV β if and only if the set {n | α(n) 6= β(n)} is almost
∗-finite in the sense
used in [11, Section 0.8.2].
The following axiom is a form of Brouwer’s famous Thesis on bars in N , see [12].
Axiom 4 (The Principle of Bar Induction).
For all B,C ⊆ N, if ∀α∃n[αn ∈ B] and B ⊆ C and ∀s[s ∈ C ↔ ∀n[s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ C]],
then 〈 〉 ∈ C,
or, equivalently,
for all B,C ⊆ [ω]<ω, if ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[ζn ∈ B] and B ⊆ C and
∀s ∈ [ω]<ω[s ∈ C ↔ ∀n[s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ [ω]<ω → s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ C]], then 〈 〉 ∈ C.
Theorem 33.
(i) ∼¬¬V and ∼
almost
V are equivalence relations on N .
(ii) For all R in E, ∼V ⊆ R ⊆ ∼¬¬V .
(iii) For all R in E, R ⊆ ∼almostV .
(iv) ∀α∀β[α ∼almostV β → ∃R ∈ E [αR β].
(v) ∀α∀β[α ∼almostV β → α ∼
¬¬
V β].
Proof. (i) One easily proves that ∼¬¬V is an equivalence relation. One needs the
fact that, for all propositions P,Q, (¬¬P ∧ ¬¬Q)→ ¬¬(P ∧ Q).
We prove that ∼almostV is a transitive relation.
Let α, β, γ be given such that α ∼almostV β and β ∼
almost
V γ.
Let ζ in [ω]ω be given. Find η in [ω]ω such that ∀n[α◦ζ◦η(n) = β◦ζ◦η(n)]. Find
p such that β ◦ ζ ◦η(p) = γ ◦ ζ ◦η(p). Define n := η(p) and note: α◦ ζ(n) = γ ◦ ζ(n).
We thus see: ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = γ ◦ ζ(n)], that is: α ∼almostV γ.
(ii) The proof is by (transfinite) induction on E . We only prove: for all R in E ,
R ⊆ ∼¬¬V as the statement: for all R in E , ∼V ⊆ R is very easy to prove.
(I) Our starting point is the trivial observation: ∀α∀β[α ∼V β → ¬¬(α ∼V β)].
(II) Now let R in E be given such that ∀α∀β[αRβ → ¬¬(α ∼V β)].
We have to prove: ∀α∀β[αR+β → ¬¬(α ∼V β)].
We do so as follows.
Let α, β be given such that αR+β.
Find n such that ∀m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)→ αRβ] and consider two special cases.
Case (1): ∃m > n[α(m) 6= β(m). Then αR β, and, therefore: ¬¬(α ∼V β).
Case (2): ¬∃m > n[α(m) 6= β(m). Then ∀m > n[α(m) = β(m)] and α ∼V β.
In both cases, we find: ¬¬(α ∼V β).
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Conclude26: ¬¬(α ∼V β).
(III) Now let R0, R1, . . . be an infinite sequence of elements of E such that, for
all n, ∀α∀β[αRnβ → ¬¬(α ∼V β)].
Define R :=
⋃
nRn and note: ∀α∀β[αRβ → ¬¬(α ∼V β)].
(iii) The proof is by (transfinite) induction on E .
(I) Our starting point is the observation: ∀α∀β[a ∼0V β → α ∼
almost
V β].
We prove this as follows:
Let α, β be given such that α ∼0V β. Find n such that ∀m > n[α(m) = β(m)].
Note: ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω][ζ(n+ 1) > n ∧ α ◦ ζ(n+ 1) = β ◦ ζ(n+ 1)].
Conclude: α ∼almostV β.
(II) Now let R in E be given such that ∀α∀β[αRβ → α ∼almostV β].
We have to prove: ∀α∀β[aR+β → α ∼almostV β].
We do so as follows.
Let α, β be given such that αR+β.
Find n such that ∀m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)→ αRβ]. Let ζ in [ω]ω be given. Consider
ζ(n+ 1) and note ζ(n+ 1) > n. There now are two cases.
Either α ◦ ζ(n+ 1) = β ◦ ζ(n+ 1) or α ◦ ζ(n+ 1) 6= β ◦ ζ(n+ 1).
In the first case we are done, and in the second case we conclude αRβ, and,
using the induction hypothesis, find p such that α ◦ ζ(p) = β ◦ ζ(p).
In both cases we conclude: ∃q[α ◦ ζ(q) = β ◦ ζ(q)].
We thus see: ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃q[α ◦ ζ(q) = β ◦ ζ(q)], that is α ∼almostV β.
Clearly then: ∀α∀β[[αR+β → α ∼almostV β].
(III) Now let R0, R1, . . . be an infinite sequence of elements of E such that, for
all n, ∀α∀β[αRnβ → α ∼almostV β].
Define R :=
⋃
nRn and note: ∀α∀β[αRβ → α ∼
almost
V β].
(iv) Let α, β be given such that α ∼almost β, that is:
∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = β ◦ ζ(n)].
Using Axiom 4, we shall prove: there exists R in E such that αRβ.
Define B :=
⋃
k{s ∈ [ω]
k+1 | α ◦ s(k) = β ◦ s(k)} and note: B is a bar in [ω]ω,
that is: ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[ζn ∈ B].
Define C :=
⋃
k{s ∈ [ω]
k | ∃n < k[α ◦ s(n) = β ◦ s(n)] ∨ ∃R ∈ E [αRβ]}.
Note: C =
⋃
k{s ∈ [ω]
k | ∀n < k[α ◦ s(n) 6= β ◦ s(n)]→ ∃R ∈ E [αRβ]}.
Note: B ⊆ C and: C is monotone, that is:
∀s ∈ [ω]<ω[s ∈ C → ∀n[s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ [ω]<ω → s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ C]].
We still have to prove that C is what one calls inductive or hereditary.
Let s in [ω]<ω be given such that ∀n[s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ [ω]<ω → s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ C].
We want to prove: s ∈ C.
Find k such that s ∈ [ω]k. In case ∃n < k[α ◦ s(n) = β ◦ s(n)], s ∈ C and we are
done, so we assume: ∀n < k[α ◦ s(n) 6= β ◦ s(n)].
Find a sequence27R0, R1, . . . of elements of E such that, for each n, if s∗〈n〉 ∈ [ω]ω
and α(n) 6= β(n), then αRnβ.
Define R := (
⋃
iRi)
+ and note: R ∈ E .
We claim: αRβ.
We establish this claim as follows.
Define p such that, if k = 0, then p := 0 and, if k > 0, then p := s(k − 1) + 1.
Assume: ∃n ≥ p[s ∗ 〈α(n) 6= β(n)] and find n ≥ p such that α(n) 6= β(n).
Note: s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ [ω]k+1 and ∀i < k + 1[α ◦ (s ∗ 〈n〉)(i) 6= β ◦ (s ∗ 〈n〉)(i)] and
s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ C. Conclude: αRnβ and α(
⋃
iRi)β.
26using the scheme: if P → Q and ¬P → Q, then ¬¬Q.
27This application of countable choice may be reduced to Axiom 3. One may define B ⊆ N
and a coding mapping α 7→ Rα such that E = {Rα | α ∈ B}.
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We thus see: ∀n ≥ p[α(n) 6= β(n)→ α(
⋃
iRi)β].
Conclude: α(
⋃
iRi)
+β, that is: αRβ, and, therefore: s ∈ C.
We thus see that C is inductive.
Using Axiom 4, we conclude: 〈 〉 ∈ C, that is: ∃R ∈ E [αRβ].
(v) Let α, β be given such that α ∼almost β, that is:
∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = β ◦ ζ(n)].
Using Axiom 4, we prove: ¬¬∃p∀n > p[α(n) = β(n)].
Define B :=
⋃
k{s ∈ [ω]
k+1 | α ◦ s(k) = β ◦ s(k)} and note: B is a bar in [ω]ω,
that is: ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[ζn ∈ B]. Define
C :=
⋃
k{s ∈ [ω]
k | ∃n < k[α ◦ s(n) = β ◦ s(n)] ∨ ¬¬∃p∀n > p[α(n) = β(n)]}.
Note: C =
⋃
k{s ∈ [ω]
k | ∀n < k[α◦s(n) 6= β ◦s(n)]→ ¬¬∃p∀n > p[α(n) = β(n)]}.
Note: B ⊆ C and C is monotone, that is:
∀s ∈ [ω]<ω[s ∈ C → ∀n[s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ [ω]<ω → s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ C]].
We still have to prove that C is inductive.
Let s in [ω]<ω be given such that ∀n[s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ [ω]<ω → s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ C]].
We want to prove: s ∈ C.
Find k such that s ∈ [ω]k. In case ∃n < k[α ◦ s(n) = β ◦ s(n)], s ∈ C, and we
are done, so we assume ∀n < k[α ◦ s(n) 6= β ◦ s(n)].
Define q such that q := 0 if k = 0 and q := s(k − 1) if k > 0.
Consider two special cases:
Case (1): ∃n > q[α(n) 6= β(n)].
Find such n, note: s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ [ω]ω and ∀i < k + 1[α ◦ (s ∗ 〈n〉)(i) 6= β ◦ (s ∗ 〈n〉)(i)]
and s ∗ 〈n〉 ∈ C, and conclude: ¬¬∃p∀n > p[α(n) = β(n)].
Case (2): ¬∃n > q[α(n) 6= β(n)], and, therefore, ∀n > q[α(n) = β(n)].
In both cases, we find: ¬¬∃p∀n > p[α(n) = β(n)].
Conclude28: ¬¬∃p∀n > p[α(n) = β(n)], and: s ∈ C.
We thus see that C is inductive.
Using Axiom 4, we conclude: 〈 〉 ∈ C, and, therefore,
¬¬∃p∀n > p[α(n) = β(n)], that is: ¬¬(α ∼V β). 
Corollary 34. (i) (N ,∼¬¬V ) |= ∀x∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y].
(ii) For each R in E, (N , R) |= ∀x¬∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y].
Proof. (i) Obvious, as, for any proposition P , ¬¬¬¬P ↔ ¬¬P .
(ii) Assume R ∈ E .
We first prove: (N , R) |= ¬∀x∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y].
Assume ∀α∀β[¬¬(αRβ) → αRβ].
Note: ∀α∀β[α ∼V β → αRβ] and, therefore: ∀α∀β[¬¬(α ∼V β)→ ¬¬(αRβ)].
Conclude: ∼¬¬V ⊆ R.
By Theorem 33(ii), R+ ⊆∼¬¬V , so R
+ ⊆ R. This contradicts Corollary 32.
The stronger statement announced in the Theorem may be proven in a similar
way. Inspection of he proof of Theorem 33 enables one to conclude:
(N , R) |= ¬∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y][0]. One easily generalizes this conclusion to:
for each α, (N , R) |= ¬∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y][α].
Conclude: (N , R) |= ∀x¬∀y[¬¬(x = y)→ x = y]. 
Markov’s Principle has been mentioned in Section 4. Markov’s Principle is not
accepted in intuitionistic mathematics, but the following observation still is of in-
terest.
Corollary 35. The following are equivalent.
(i) Markov’s Principle: ∀α[¬¬∃n[α(n) = 0]→ ∃n[α(n) = 0]].
28Using the scheme: If P → Q and ¬P → Q, then ¬¬Q.
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(ii) ∼¬¬V ⊆ ∼
almost
V .
(iii) ∼almostV is stable.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii). Assume ¬¬(α ∼V β), that is ¬¬∃n∀m > n[α(m) = β(m)].
Let ζ ∈ [ω]ω be given.
Assume: ¬∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = β ◦ ζ(n)].
Then ∀n[ζ(n + 1) > n ∧ α ◦ ζ(n) 6= β ◦ ζ(n)], so ∀n∃m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)].
Contradiction.
Conclude: ¬¬∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = β ◦ ζ(n)] and, by Markov’s Principle,
∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = β ◦ ζ(n)].
We thus see ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = β ◦ ζ(n)], that is: α ∼almostV β.
(ii)⇒ (iii). By Theorem 33(v), ∼almostV ⊆ ∼
¬¬
V . Therefore: (∼
almost
V )
¬¬ ⊆ ∼¬¬V .
Using (ii), we conclude: (∼almostV )
¬¬ ⊆ ∼almostV , that is: ∼
almost
V is stable.
(iii) ⇒ (i). Let α be given such that ¬¬∃n[α(n) 6= 0].
Define β such that ∀m[β(m) = 0↔ ∃n ≤ m[α(n) = 0]].
Note: ¬¬(β ∼V 0) and, therefore: ¬¬(β ∼almostV 0).
Conclude, using (iii), β ∼almostV 0.
Define ζ such that ∀n[ζ(n) = n].
Find m such that β ◦ ζ(m) = β(m) = 0 and, therefore, ∃n ≤ m[α(n) = 0].
We thus see: ∀α[¬¬∃n[α(n) = 0] → ∃n[α(n) = 0]], that is: Markov’s Principle.

12. Equality and equivalence
We did not succeed in finding a sentence ψ such that (N ,∼V ) |= ψ and
(N ,∼ωV ) |= ¬ψ. We now want to compare the structures (N ,=,∼V ) and
(N ,=,∼ωV ). We need a first order language with two binary relation symbols: =
and ∼. The symbol = will denote the equality relation and the symbol ∼ will
denote, in the first structure, the relation ∼V and, in the second structure, the
relation ∼ωV . The reader hopefully will not be confused by the fact that, in the
earlier sections, where we used the first order language with a single binary relation
symbol, =, the symbol = denoted the relations ∼V and ∼
ω
V .
The next Theorem makes us see that equality is decidable on each equivalence
class of ∼V whereas, on each equivalence class of ∼ωV , it is not decidable.
Theorem 36.
(i) (N ,=,∼V ) |= ∀x∀y[x ∼ y → (x = y ∨ ¬(x = y))].
(ii) (N ,=,∼ωV ) |= ∀x¬∀y[x ∼ y→ (x = y ∨ ¬(x = y)].
Proof. (i) Let γ, α be given such that γ ∼V α.
Find n such that ∀m > n[γ(m) = α(m)] and distinguish two cases.
Either γ(m+ 1) = α(m+ 1) and γ = α, or γ(m+ 1) 6= α(m+ 1) and ¬(γ = α).
Conclude: ∀γ∀α[γ ∼V α→ (γ = α ∨ ¬(γ = α)].
(ii) Let γ be given.
Consider Fγ1 := {α | ∀m∀n[(α(m) 6= γ(m) ∧ α(n) 6= γ(n)→ m = n]}.
Note: Fγ1 is a spread.
Also: ∀α ∈ Fγ1 [γ ∼
1
V α]
29 and, therefore, ∀α ∈ Fγ1 [γ ∼
ω
V α].
Assume ∀α ∈ Fγ1 [γ = α ∨ ¬(γ = α)]. Applying Lemma 1, find p such that
either ∀α ∈ Fγ1 [γp ⊏ α → γ = α] or ∀α[γp ⊏ α → ¬(γ = α)], and note that both
alternatives are false.
Conclude: ∀γ¬∀α[γ ∼ωV α ∨ ¬(γ = α)]. 
29See the proof of Theorem 26(iii)
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Lemma 37. (∼¬¬V )
+ ⊆ ∼¬¬V and (∼
almost
V )
+ ⊆ ∼almostV .
30
Proof. Assume α(∼¬¬V )
+β.
Find n such that ∀m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)→ α ∼¬¬V β].
Note: if ∃m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)], then α ∼¬¬V β, and if ¬∃m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)],
then ∀m > n[α(m) = β(m)] and α ∼V β and also α ∼¬¬V β.
Conclude: ¬¬(α ∼¬¬V β), and, therefore, α ∼
¬¬
V β.
Assume α(∼almostV )
+β.
Find n such that ∀m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)→ α ∼almostV β].
Let ζ in [ω]ω be given. Note: ζ(n+ 1) > n.
Either : α ◦ ζ(n+ 1) = β ◦ ζ(n+ 1) or : α ∼almostV β and ∃p[α ◦ ζ(p) = β ◦ ζ(p)].
We thus see: ∀ζ ∈ [ω]ω∃n[α ◦ ζ(n) = β ◦ ζ(n)], that is: α ∼almostV β. 
Lemma 38. For every shift-invariant binary relation R on N ,
R+ ⊆ R if and only if (N , R) |= ∀x∀y[
(
AP (x, y)→ x ∼ y
)
→ x ∼ y].
Proof. First assume R+ ⊆ R.
Assume α # β → αRβ.
Then: ∀m > 0[α(m) 6= β(m)→ αRβ], so: αR+β, and, therefore: αRβ.
We thus see: (N , R) |= ∀x∀y[
(
AP (x, y)→ x ∼ y
)
→ x ∼ y].
Now assume (N , R) |= ∀x∀y[
(
AP (x, y)→ x ∼ y
)
→ x ∼ y].
Assume αR+β. Find n such that ∀m > n[α(m) 6= β(m)→ αRβ].
Define γ, δ such that ∀m[γ(m) = α(n+ 1 +m) ∧ δ(m) = β(n+ 1 +m)].
Note: γ # δ → αRβ, and, as R is shift-invariant, also: γ # δ → γRδ, and,
therefore: γRδ, and also: αRβ.
We thus see: R+ ⊆ R. 
Corollary 39. (i) (N ,∼¬¬V ) |= ∀x∀y[
(
AP (x, y)→ x ∼ y
)
→ x ∼ y].
(ii) (N ,∼almostV ) |= ∀x∀y[
(
AP (x, y)→ x ∼ y
)
→ x ∼ y].
(iii) For each R in E, (N , R) |= ¬∀x∀y[
(
AP (x, y)→ x ∼ y
)
→ x ∼ y].
Proof. Use Lemmas 37 and 38 and Corollary 32. 
13. Notations and conventions
We use m,n, . . . as variables over the set ω = N of the natural numbers.
For every P ⊆ N such that ∀n[P (n) ∨ ¬P (n)], for all m,
m = µn[P (n)]↔
(
P (m) ∧ ∀n < m[¬P (n)]
)
.
(m,n) 7→ J(m,n) is a one-to-one surjective mapping from ω × ω onto ω.
K,L : ω × ω are its inverse functions, so ∀n[J
(
K(n), L(n)
)
= n].
For each n, n′ := K(n) and n′′ := L(n).
(n0, n1, . . . , nk−1) 7→ 〈n0, n1, . . . , nk−1〉 is a one-to-one surjective mapping from
the set of finite sequences of natural numbers to the set of the natural numbers.
〈n0, n1, . . . , nk−1〉 is the code of the finite sequence (n0, n1, . . . , nk−1).
s 7→ length(s) is is the function that, for each s, gives the length of the finite
sequence coded by s.
s, n 7→ s(n) is the function that, for all s, n, gives the value of the finite sequence
coded by s at n. If n ≥ length(s), then s(n) = 0.
For all s, k, if length(s) = k, then s = 〈s(0), s(1), . . . s(k − 1)〉.
0 = 〈 〉 codes the empty sequence of natural numbers,
the unique finite sequence s such that length(s) = 0.
ωk := {s | length(s) = k}.
30Following the terminology in [8], a binary relation R on N should be called perhapsive if
R+ ⊆ R.
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[ω]k := {s ∈ ωk | ∀i[i+ 1 < k→ s(i) < s(i + 1)]}.
[ω]<ω :=
⋃
k[ω]
k.
For all s, k, t, l, if s ∈ ωk and t ∈ ωl, then s ∗ t is the element u of ωk+l such that
∀i < k[u(i) = s(i)] and ∀j < l[u(k + j) = t(j)].
s ⊑ t↔ ∃u[s ∗ u = t].
s ⊏ t↔ (s ⊑ t ∧ s 6= t).
We use α, β, . . . as variables over Baire space, the set ωω := N of functions from
N to N.
(α, n) 7→ α(n) is the function that associates to all α, n, the value of α at n.
For all α, β, α ◦ β is the element γ of N such that ∀n[γ(n) = α
(
β(n)
)
].
2ω := C := {α | ∀n[α(n) < 2]} is Cantor space.
For all α, for all k, for all s in ωk, α ◦ s is the element t of ωk satisfying
∀n < k[t(k) = α
(
s(k)
)
].
For each s, k, if s ∈ ωk, then, for each α, s ∗ α is the element β of N such that
∀i < k[β(i) = s(i)] and ∀i[β(k + i) = α(i)].
For each s, for each X ⊆ N , s ∗ X := {s ∗ α | α ∈ X}.
For each α, for each n, αn is the element ofN satisfying ∀m[αn(m) = α
(
J(n,m)
)
].
For each m, m ∈ N is the element of N satisfying ∀n[m(n) = m].
S is the element of N satisfying ∀n[S(n) = n+ 1].
∀n[α′(n) =
(
α(n)
)′
∧ α′′(n) =
(
α(n)
)′′
].
αn := 〈α(0), α(1), . . . α(n− 1)〉.
s ⊏ α↔ ∃n[αn = s].
α ⊥ β ↔ α # β ↔ ∃n[α(n) 6= β(n)].
[ω]ω := {ζ ∈ N | ∀i[ζ(i) < ζ(i + 1)]}.
Q, the set of the rationals, may be defined as a subset of ω, with accompanying
relations =Q, <Q, ≤Q and operations +Q,−Q, ·Q.
R := {α | ∀n[α′(n) ∈ Q ∧ α′′(n) ∈ Q] ∧
∀n[α′(n) ≤Q α′(n+ 1) ≤Q α′′(n+ 1) ≤Q α′′(n)] ∧ ∀m∃n[α′′(n)−Q α′(n) <Q
1
2m ]}.
For all α, β in R,
α <R β ↔ ∃n[α′′(n) <Q β′(n)] and α =R β ↔
(
¬(α <R β) ∧ ¬(β <R α)
)
.
Operations +R,−R are defined straightforwardly.
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